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Let us start by stating a strong opinion: psychology can only claim honesty when it 
makes the effort to relate its own theories and other observations about human 
behaviour and experience to actual human behaviour and experience in the real world. 
 
In this respect, we agree with some of the assumptions the authors make in this article 
and we share with the authors a sense of frustration that so much effort in cognitive 
psychology can sometimes yield very little insight beyond the relative sterility shown by 
some laboratory phenomena.  
 
Late in the year 1999 one of us (RJW) was asked to provide expert witness evidence to 
a Public Inquiry that followed a fatal train crash in London (Cullen, 2001). The 
fundamental question was whether there was any good perceptual explanation for a 
driver proceeding through a red signal when on so many other occasions he and other 
drivers had not got it wrong. To cut short a long story, it was found that some 5 or 6 
seconds away from the signal, it would have appeared to be yellow not red for a brief 
moment because of a combination of optical and visual factors. However, no-one was 
able to explain why in the remaining time beyond that brief moment, when the signal 
should have reverted to appearing red, the driver didn't notice that the signal was in fact 
red. Although the driver would have had no reason to look at the signal again, five 
seconds is a long time.  
 
Another expert witness had suggested that inhibition of return might have caused the 
train driver to miss the signal. On approach to the signal, but before it come into view, it 
was suggested that the driver may have looked in the direction of the signal. It was not 
there, so he didn't learn anything about the signal. However, inhibition of return would 
have meant that he was unlikely or unable to look in that direction again and so never 
saw the signal. This doesn't sound plausible, and were inhibition of return such a 
powerful effect no-one would travel by rail. Indeed it turns out that we must take some 
care with the phenomenon – the original data show a slight slowing of an eye-movement 
to a place that has just been inspected. The effect is small (a small fraction of a second 
longer latency) and occurs over a fairly brief time period of a second or so.  
 
On the face of it, inhibition of return seems like a good instance of the type of laboratory 
finding that we are warned against in the Cognitive Ethology approach. On simple 
common-sense and introspective grounds, it seems wholly unlikely to exist or to matter. 
But it does exist and we are probably better off knowing about it. There's no reason to 
suppose that inhibition of return would not occur in the real world, just lots of reasons for 
thinking it would be hard to measure out there.  
 
Now we state a second opinion: humans are so profoundly expert in the real world that 
studying them there can be uninformative and perhaps even misleading. A simple broad 
example will help. Our visual system rarely lets us down in the real world – nearly all the 
time it gets it right. We don't often discover lacunae in our perception of the environment 
– moments or places where what we see and what happens do not match.  
 
 The problem is essentially a pragmatic one. You learn most about a computation when it 
comes out wrong. If you are asked what 362×2 comes to, and you say 724 then almost 
nothing is learnt about how you did it, except that you have used one of the large 
number of competent methods. If you say 624, then we know you have used a 
mechanism that involved carrying digits to the base 10 forward (and that you forgot to). If 
you say 700ish, then we know you've used a slide rule or some other device that deals 
in approximations. And so on. 
 
This problem is a variant on the beautiful notion of Braitenberg (1989), which he 
encapsulated in the "law of uphill analysis and downhill invention". A quote suffices: 
"It is pleasurable and easy to create little machines that do certain tricks. It 
is also quite easy to observe the full repertoire of behaviour of these 
machines – even if it goes beyond what we had planned, as it often does. 
But it is much more difficult to start from the outside and to try and guess 
internal structure just from the observation of behaviour."  
 
If it is accepted that successful performance is not very useful in analysing the structure 
of a complex system, then it follows that one avoids places where the system displays 
consummate skill and instead looks for a situation where the system delivers wrong 
answers. For me and my area of expertise, visual perception, the laboratory wins every 
time. The simple reason that the laboratory works in studying vision is that the visual 
system makes massive assumptions about the probable or statistical nature of the world. 
These assumptions work in the real world. However, a carefully constructed laboratory 
stimulus can defeat these assumptions and reveal the mechanisms.  
 
Figure 1 shows a stimulus that we are presently interested in. Whilst it is an 
unremarkable laboratory stimulus in vision, it is certainly not one that the environment 
has in any quantity. In that sense, it could perhaps be written off as a laboratory 
curiosity. However, cover up all the even numbered lines (the second, fourth etc) and 
you will discover that hidden in the figure is perfectly regular array of evenly spaced 
lines. Even when you know that the regularity is there you cannot see it. From this 
simple observation, we can conclude these points about the machinery of spatial vision: 
- you cannot readily judge distances between non-adjacent features 
- in addition, you cannot readily combine pairs of judgements of distances 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
A good laboratory study is one that forces cognition to get it wrong. Errors of commission 
– cognition doing things it shouldn't – and errors of omission – cognition not doing things 
it should – are equally useful. The example in Figure 1 is an error of omission – despite 
there being every incentive to see the regularity you simply haven't got the machinery 
needed to see it: cognition has omitted this operation.  
 
 But the authors are right in this next respect. It is not explanatory to describe the 
phenomenon of Figure 1 in laboratory terms such as "failure to detect second-order 
periodicities" (which just describe the stimulus), or in terms of a visual mechanism such 
as "adjacency detector" (which just describe the nearest the participant can get to doing 
the task). They talk (p17 of ms) clearly of the wish for "a satisfying answer as to why 
cognitive performance is like it is". I agree that wish. The explanation for the 
phenomenon of Figure 1 is  
- hardly ever does the real world offer us a row of identical stimuli that are actually 
two interleaved independent patterns  
- if ever it does, such a pattern is most unlikely to have any meaning 
- consequently vision has no use for a mechanism that might use valuable 
resource to consider such a possibility.  
This is what Marr (1982) would have called a Computational Theory, and what the 
authors call a "personal" level explanation. I am fully with them on this, never having 
recovered from the effects of reading Marr at a relatively impressionable age. 
 
Vision may be a special case, less needing of Cognitive Ethology. One area of research 
where studying perception in the real world may seem to be the only sensible approach 
is in the perception of music. In the real world, listening to music is often a very rich 
personal experience and even varies from occasion to occasion. At a concert we may 
experience an overwhelming emotional reaction to the music, whilst on other occasions 
we have no response other than a basic appreciation for the same piece of music. The 
simple issue is whether a listener hears music in the same way in a laboratory as they 
do a concert or using their MP3 player. On balance, it is very likely that they don't. If they 
don't, then laboratory studies of music perception are not what they claim to be. 
 
This is a strong criticism and maybe unreasonable. Studies of music perception go to 
extraordinary lengths to ensure that the stimuli they use are musical – sequences of 
notes that are broadly in line with musical practice. Studies of music perception tend to 
use exclusively or predominantly musical participants – formally trained or student 
musicians. However, they do not use listening conditions that are musical. Actually the 
situation is more like a facet of the real world than will be apparent. Music students will 
be only too familiar with being asked to listen to some musical stimulus in a classroom 
and make some musical judgement – that is how their ear is trained to hear musically. 
Presumably, they treat the perceptual laboratory as a similar experience, possibly with 
unwanted consequences. 
 
Does this line of thinking rule out the use of laboratory studies to inform our 
understanding of music perception? We think not, but once again success in the 
laboratory depends on what you do there. You can't directly study the perception of hope 
in Mendelssohn's Fingal's Cave in the laboratory because the prospects of eliciting that 
percept in the laboratory are hopeless. On the other hand, if it depends (when it does 
happen in the concert hall) on our ability to perceive and interpret relationships between 
sound and time, then these at least can be studied in the laboratory. We would go 
further and say that they must be studied in the laboratory because it is only there that 
you can break the expertise of the experienced musical listener in all of us and the 
richness of time information, by generating deliberately impoverished stimuli. 
 
To conclude, we propose a simple signal detection analysis of Cognitive Ethology. Let's 
treat valid findings as hits, invalid findings as false alarms and everything else as 
misses. Now for each hit, let us suppose that it can be characterized by (i) whether it can 
 be discovered by laboratory work or not, and (ii) whether it can be discovered by real-
world work checked by laboratory studies. There are then potentially 4 types of finding: 
 
Real World Laboratory 
Type 1 Yes Yes 
Type 2 No Yes 
Type 3 Yes No 
Type 4 No No 
 
Type 1 and Type 4 are irrelevant – we can get the hits either way. If we stay in our labs, 
then we lose Type 3; if we stay away from our labs, or only use our labs to confirm 
observations made in the real world, then we lose Type 2. Now we must look at the false 
alarms. Exactly the same table applies. If we stay in our labs, then we risk Type 2 false 
alarms; if we stay away from our labs, we risk Type 3 false alarms.  The optimum 
strategy depends on the relative probabilities, costs and benefits of Type 2 hits and Type 
2 false alarms, compared with the relative probabilities, costs and benefits of Type 3 hits 
and Type 3 false alarms. The authors are saying that:  
- the probability of Type 2 hits is lower than Type 3 hits 
- the benefits of Type 2 hits are less than Type 3 hits 
- the probability of Type 2 false alarms is greater than Type 3 false alarms 
- the costs of Type 2 false alarms are greater than Type 3 false alarms 
We agree that it is not difficult to find thoughtless laboratory studies that confirm their 
views. However, none of these propositions seem strongly self-evident, provided some 
care goes into what one does in the laboratory. 
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